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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN 
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS: 
FEIST PUBLICATIONS v. RURAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE COMPANY 
"ALTRUISM EXPRESSED IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW" 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to create copy-
right laws. 1 This grant contains inherent tensions between 
protecting the author's fruits of labor and providing the pub-
lic with access to copyrighted works.2 Copyright law reflects 
these tensions. 
Until recently two competing theories about what copyright 
protection is available to factual compilations split the circuit 
courts of appeal. The Copyright Act defines a compilation as "a 
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged 
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship."3 Fact-based compilations 
involve factual preexisting materials or data.· 
The two theories which split the circuit courts of appeal 
over copyright protection available to fact-based compila-
tions are the "sweat of the brow" theory, previously followed 
In three circuits,6 and the "selection, arrangement, or 
1. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infra p. 531. 
2.Id. 
3. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). 
4. Traditional examples off actual works include maps, charts, telephone books, 
photographs, and business forms. Davidson, Sympo8ium: The Future of Software 
Protection: Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PI'M'. L. REV. 1037, 1103 (1986). 
5. The circuits following the ·sweat of the brow· theory were the Seventh, 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines &; Co., 905 F.2d 
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (vacating 
judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of Feist), on remand, 932 F.2d 
610 (7th Cir. 1991) (remanding for entry of judgment against plaintitTin light of Fei8t); 
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985); Feist 
Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 916 F.2d 718 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. granted,_ 
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coordination" theory8 previously followed in four circuits.7 In 
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service CO.,8 the Supreme 
Court clarified the law. The Court rejected the "sweat of the 
brow" theory which rewarded the labor required to produce a 
work with copyright protection.9 Instead, the Court stated 
that copyright protection extends only to the "manner in which 
the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and 
arranged. "10 The Court noted that the 1976 Copyright Act 
makes it clear that copyright requires originality, II facts are not 
original,12 and that therefore copyright does not necessarily 
extend to facts contained in a compilation. IS 
In the wake of Feist, copyright practitioners are scrambling 
to determine what it all means, and how best to protect their 
client's intellectual property rights and interests. 14 While dif-
ferent views are presented, an expression of dismay is com-
mon. 16 This note will address the question: are the copyright 
practitioners justified in their concern? Part I will outline the 
6. Hereinafter "selection· theory. 
7. The circuits following the selection theory were the Second, Fifth, Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investment Serv., 
751 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1984),808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 820 (1987); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365,1369-70 (5th Cir. 
1981); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory 
Pub., 756 F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985). 
8. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) [hereinafter Feist]. 
9. Id. at 1291. 
10. Id. at 1294. 
11. Id. at 1295. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) states in part: "Copyright protection sub-
sists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... • 
12'. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) states in part: "In no case does copyright pro-
tection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.· 
13. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) states: "The copyright in a compilation or 
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, 
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not 
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is 
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownerShip, or sub-
sistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.· 
14. See Beck, Two Views on the Implications of Feist v. Rural Telephone: 
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Databases after Feist, 8 THE COMPUTER LAw., 
July 1991, at 1; Bartz, Two Views on the Implications of Feist v. Rural Telephone: The 
Beginning of the End of Software Overprotection', 8 THE COMPUTER LAw., July 1991, 
at 10; Abramson, High Court Ruling Means New Rules for Compilers, DIRECT 
MARKETING NEWS, Apr. 29, 1991, at 54 (NEXIS, OMNI library). 
15. See, e.g .• Beck. supra note 14, at 1; Bartz. supra note 14. at 10; Abramson, 
supra note 14, at 54. 
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Constitutional underpinnings of copyright protection. More 
specifically, this Part will discuss the two theories underlying 
the case law in the circuit courts of appeal, including a dis-
cussion of their legal philosophies. Part II will examine the 
Court's decision in Feist. Part III will analyze and critique the 
Court's decision, discuss practical implications, and present 
various alternate protections for databases. Finally, this note 
will conclude that there is little cause for concern, and the inter-
ests of copyright practitioners must properly yield to the 
Court's expression of the altruistic principles inherent in copy-
right law. 
I. THE INHERENT TENSIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright law represents a compromise between social 
policies. 16 The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "17 Within this 
grant lies an inherent tension between affording protection to 
the individual author, and providing the general public with 
access to information. IS 
One social policy favors wide dissemination of ideas. 19 This 
competes with another policy giving writers and artists a fair 
economic reward by means of a monopoly over their works.20 
One apparent result of these competing policies has been the 
concurrent development oflegal theory promoting the policy of 
incentive to authors ("sweat of the brow" theory), and a legal 
theory promoting the policy of wide dissemination and use of 
ideas ("selection" theory). 
A. THE "SWEAT OF THE BROW" THEORY: PROMOTING THE SOCIAL 
POLICY FAVORING ECONOMIC REWARD TO WRITERS 
The "sweat of the brow" theory evolved from John Locke's 
natural law theory.21 Locke's theory posited that one has a 
16. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the 
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 519 n.11 (1981). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18. Denicola, supra note 16, at 519. 
19. 1d. 
20.1d. 
21. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT para. 27, at 17 (T. Peardon 
rev. ed. 1952) (1st ed. 1690). 
3
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property interest in one's body, and therefore in the work of 
one's body.22 
The idea that this property interest is copyrightable was 
best embodied by the case law in Jeweler's Circular Publishing 
Co. v. Keystone Publishing CO.,23 the seminal case describing the 
"sweat of the brow" theory. There, quoting Kelly v. Morris, 24 the 
Jeweler's Circular court noted that the defendant was mistaken 
in arguing that copyright did not protect the exertion oflabor 
required to collect facts. The Jeweler's Circular court stated 
that so long as labor is expended in the preparation of a work, 
copyright protection is available.25 
B. THE "SELECTION" THEORY: PROMOTING THE SOCIAL POLICY 
FAVORING WIDE DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS 
Recall that the two competing interests inherent in copy-
right are economic incentives promoting authorship, and lim-
its on copyright availability promoting wide dissemination or 
sharing of ideas. It is widely accepted that economic incentives 
are neccessary so authors will continue to create works and dis-
seminate them to the public. This has been described as copy-
right's "core" doctrine. 26 
Recent theorists have recognized that the economic incen-
tive of copyright protection can work against authors "sharing" 
works in the interest of promoting the progress of arts and sci-
ences.27 One theorist28 posits that the natural law theory, relied 
on in Jeweler's Circular and ot.her cases establishing a copy-
rightable property interest in one's labor, is misguided. 
According to Alfred Yen, original natural law partook of a 
moral character which was later replaced by economic 
efficiency.29 
22. Id. 
23. 281 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1922) cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922) [hereinafter 
Jeweler's Circular]. 
24. 1 Law Rptr. Equity 697 (1866). 
25. Jeweler's Circular, 281 F. at 88. The "sweat of the brow" theory is various-
ly known as the "industrious collection" theory.Id. 
26. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the B~tamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1619 (1982). 
27. See, e.g., Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 517 n,l (arguing for the restoration of our "natural law heritage" 
which recognizes both economic and moral values in copyright). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/13
1992] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 533 
Another theorist has recently challenged the basic assump-
tion that economic incentives are necessary to motivate authors 
to produce works.30 Linda Lacey argues that a fundamental flaw 
of copyright law assumes all artists are primarily motivated by 
economics.31 She asserts that in reality, artists32 are motivat-
ed by a variety of interests. 33 One can reason that if authors are 
motivated to create works by more than mere economics, elim-
inating the economic incentive will not necessarily spell the end 
of intellectual property production. 
Wide availability of copyrighted works is generally regard-
ed to be in the "public interest."34 Lacey disputes the com-
monly used meaning of "public interest." She acknowledges that 
"[c]ontemporary liberal theory regards the 'public' as a 
Hobbesian collection of autonomous individuals, each acting out 
of self interest. "36 However, Lacey asserts that: 
[the] 'public' also can be understood as an 
interdependent community with certain 
common interests that affect all its mem-
bers ... even individuals who are not direct 
recipients of artistic work benefit from its 
availability to society, just as free public 
education does more for a community than 
30. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989:2 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1571 
(1989). 
31. Id. Lacey admits that "[o)fcourse, a significant number of people indeed do 
create exclusively to make money ... [b)ut the assumption that the financial motive is 
universal is simply incorrect and should not continue to be the exclusive foundation 
of copyright law." Id. at 1574. 
32. Although Lacey primarily discusses "artists" in her article, her theory is equal-
ly applicable to all authors of copyrighted works. Lacey uses the term '''artist' ... in its 
broadest sense to include writers, sculptors, choreographers, etc.--anyone who creates 
a product that can be protected by copyright law."Id. at 1532 n.3. Further, she notes 
that "[a]ll intellectual property can be categorized roughly as work that has either polit-
ical, educational, aesthetic, or entertainment value, or as work that has value in sev-
eral of these contexts." Id. at 1588. 
33. Lacey notes that even among successful writers, economic gain was "their least 
popular reason to write." Id. at 1574 n.195 (citing P.E.N. International, News Release 
(undated) (file on copy in journal office), at 4). 
34. Id. at 1584. For this proposition Lacey cites, e.g., 3 M. & D. NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A], at 13-72; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600, 1601 (1982); Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and its 
Forebears, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 269, 291-92 (1984); Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable 
Tool for Maintaining Copyright Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REv. 735, 754 (l983).Id. at 1584 
n.229. 
35. Id. at 1584-85 (citing T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63-66, 104-10 (Everyman's 
Library ed. 1983». 
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serving the individual needs of parents of 
school age children. "86 
One can reason that if the public interest entails shared com-
munity interests rather than "the autonomous interests of a 
large number of people,"87 "Progress of Science and useful 
Arts"88 results when the community at large can reap the ben-
efits of authors building on other's works without having to 
reinvent the wheel. To serve this "public interest," less copy-
right protection is necessary. 
The "selection" theory can be seen as recognizing a need to 
reestablish the public's interest in copyright. This can be 
viewed as a shift in emphasis from individualism to altru-
ism. 89 Individualism is described as self-interest and self 
reliance,4o while altruism is defined as a belief that one's own 
interest should not necessarily be preferred over the interests 
of others. 41 
According to Duncan Kennedy, individualist and altruistic 
principles pervade our entire legal system, creating "flatly 
contradictory visions of the universe."42 The simultaneous 
existence of individualism and altruism causes legal theo-
rists, lawyers, and judges to examine the true interaction 
between law and society.48 The juxtaposition of these two 
36. Id. at 1585. 
37. Id. at 1596. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39. Lacey, supra note 30, at 1533. 
40. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 
1685, 1713 (1976). 
41. Id.atl717. 
42. Id. at 1776. 
43. Kennedy describes a transition "from Classical to modern legal 
thought ... through the imagery of core and periphery." The "core" was: 
equated with firm adherence to autonomy, facilitation and self-
determination. The existence of countertendencies was acknowl-
edged, but in a backhanded way. By its "very nature," freedom 
must have limits; these could be derived as implications from that 
nature; and they would then constitute the periphery of excep-
tions to the core doctrines (emphasis in original)." 
Id. at 1737. In Kennedy's view, today we recognize both the "core" and the "periphery," 
because both exist in the law and its relation to reality. Kennedy asserts: 
What distinguishes the modern situation is the breakdown 
of the conceptual boundary between the core and the 
periphery, so that all the conflicting positions are at least 
potentially relevant to all issues. The Classical concepts 
oriented us to one ethos or the other -- to core or periphery 
-- and then permitted consistent argument within that point 
6
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seemingly contradictory principles creates tension in the law. 44 
This tension results in the generation of new ideas, or a syn-
thesis of the old into a new vision.4s Similarly, Lacey's defini-
tion of the public interest includes a communal aspect. This is 
an altruistic notion. Her revelation that multiple motivations 
inspire authors accompanies her scrutiny of copyright's inher-
ent tensions. This examination of the interaction between law 
and society leads to a new vision of copyright. 46 In this context 
the "selection" theory is the new vision, better serving the 
author's and community's needs. Therefore, one can approve 
the Supreme Court's embrace of the "selection" theory as a wel-
come attempt to enforce, at the highest level, the altruistic 
principles inherent in copyright law. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IN FEIST 
A. THE FACTS OF FEIST 
Feist concerned the unprivileged use of information con-
tained in a white pages directory published by Rural Telephone 
CompanyY Rural Telephone Company had published the direc-
tory as part of its mandate as a public utility. 48 
1d. 
of view, with a few hard cases occurring at the borderline. 
Now, each of the conflicting visions claims universal 
relevance, but is unable to establish hegemony anywhere. 
44. Kennedy describes this tension as "the sticking points of the two sides--the 
moments at which the individualist, in his movement towards the state of nature, sud-
denly reverses himself and becomes an altruist, and the symmetrical moment at 
which the altruist becomes an advocate of rules and self-reliance rather than slide all 
the way to total collectivism or anarchism.· Id. at 1767. 
45. Kennedy gives the example of a judge in a contract dispute faced with fol-
lowing precedent or recognizing the injustice such slavish rule following would work: 
"there is value as well as an element oCreal nobility in the judicial decision to throw 
out, every time the opportunity arises, consumer contracts designed to perpetuate the 
exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit. Real people are involved, even if 
there are not very many whose lives the decision can affect.· 1d. at 1777. 
46. Indeed, Lacey's new vision reaches beyond copyright to property law in gen-
eral. Lacey argues that limited ownership logically should not extend only to intel-
lectual property: 
The spirit of altruism that permeates the language of copy-
right theory is indeed moving. But until we apply that self-
less spirit and those persuasive reasons why intellectual 
property must be shared with the community to other forms 
of property, we are being hypocritical at the expense of the 
artist and society. The anthem of the striking women textile 
workers, which has become a feminist rallying cry, is right: 
We must have both bread and roses-one without the other 
never will be enough. 
Lacey, supra note 30, at 1596. 
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Feist Publications, an independent publisher, began to 
publish white and yellow pages directories,49 The white page 
directories were organized into separate geographic areas. 50 The 
yellow pages were similarly organized and marketed to 
geographic areas corresponding to those in the white pages.61 
In order to obtain the white pages information, Feist 
Publications entered into licensing agreements with all utili-
ties except Rural Telephone Company who declined to enter into 
such an agreement.62 
In an effort to obtain the necessary listings, Feist 
Publications extracted the information from Rural Telephone 
Company's directory.63 Rural Telephone Company had sus-
pected Feist Publications of extracting information from its 
directory, and therefore had included several fictitious listings.54 
When Feist Publications published its directory, 1,309 of its 
46,878 listings were identical to those contained in Rural 
Telephone Company's directory, including four fictitious 
listings;66 
Rural Telephone Company sued Feist Publications for 
copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of 
Kansas. 66 Rural Telephone Company asserted that Feist 
Publications was obliged to separately canvass for the infor-
mation contained in its directory.67 Feist Publications countered 
that Rural Telephone Company's directory was outside the 
protection of copyright,68 and alternatively defended on 
antitrust grounds.69 The district court determined that antitrust 
was not a defense to copyright, and severed that issue from the 
case. 60 The district court then found that Feist Publications had 
infringed Rural Telephone Company's copyright. 61 Feist 






54. Rural Tel. Servo CO. V. Feist Publications, 663 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. Kan. 1987) 
[hereinafter Rural]. 
55. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287. 
56. Rural, 663 F. Supp. at 216. 
57. Feist, III S. Ct. at 1287. 
58. Rural, 663 F. Supp. at 217. 
59. 1d. at 216. 
60.1d. 
61. 1d. at 220. 
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Circuit affirmed,62 without opinion. The Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari on the issue of copyright.53 
B. ORIGINALITY: "THE SINE QUA NON OF COPYRIGHT"64 
In Feist, the Supreme Court noted that The Trade-Mark 
Cases65 addressed the scope of the Constitutional source of 
Congressional power to "secur[e] for limited Times to 
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."66 
There, the Supreme Court determined that originality is 
Constitutionally required in order for a work to qualify as the 
writing of an author.67 The Court stated that "[t]he writings 
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, 
embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like."66 
In Feist, the Court concluded that the touchstone of copy-
right protection is the originality requirement articulated in 
The Trade-Mark Cases. 69 As applied to factual compilations, the 
Court held that the basis for originality lies in choosing facts· 
for inclusion, as well as ordering and arranging them in a 
useful fashion. 70 The Court further stated that so long as such 
compilations are independently assembled and contain mini-
mal creativity, they are protected by copyright.71 
C. ORIGINALITY IN FACTUAL COMPILATIONS STATUTORILY 
REQUIRES SELECTION AND ARRANGEMENT, NOT "SWEAT OF THE 
BROW"72 
In Feist, the Supreme Court cited its decision in 
International News Service v. Associated Press7S for the propo-
sition that the copyright statute does "not permit the 'sweat of 
the brow' approach."7. Although the Court in International 
News noted that the 1909 Copyright Act included newspa-
pers among copyrightable materials, the idea that copyright 
62. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1989). 
63. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286. 
64. Id. at 1287. 
65. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
66. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
67. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
68.Id. 
69. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288. 
70. Id. at 1289. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1292. 
73. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter International News]. 
74. Feist, 111 S.Ct. at 1292. 
9
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extended to facts contained in an article was completely reject-
ed.75 There, the Court held that the information forming the news 
reported in newspapers is not an original creation but rather a 
report of information 'rightfully belonging to the public. 76 
Further, the Court noted that historically copyright law has 
comprehended a distinction between the necessity for dis-
seminating factual works and the necessity for disseminating 
fictional works.77 Therefore copyright in factual works is nec-
essarily "thin"78 since copyright may only extend to the author's 
artistic expression, and not to the facts expressed. 
The Court looked to the legislative histories of all the copy-
right acts for further support for its interpretation of the orig-
inality requirement. The Court noted that Congress 
incorporated the Register's advice contained in the Report of 
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. 
Copyright Law. 79 The report suggested that the originality 
requirement be explicit in order to clear up "misconceptions as 
to what is copyrightable matter. "80 
The Court acknowledged that after the 1976 revisions to the 
Copyright Act, the touchstone of copyright protection in fact-
based compilations was originality and not "sweat of the 
brow. "81 The Court summarized the Congressional responses to 
confusion in this area.82 The Court concluded that copyright 
revisions clearly explain that copyright requires originality,83 
facts are not original,8' copyright does not extend to the facts 
75. ld. (quoting International News, 248 U.S. at 234). 
76.ld. 
77. ld. (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985». 
78. When an author recounts historical facts, copyright extends only to his 
"subjective descriptions," and if there are none, copyright is only available to "[t]he 
only conceivable expression ... the manner in which the compiler has selected and 
arranged the facts." ld. at 1289. 
79. ld. at 1292. 
80. ld. (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 
REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAw 9 (Comm: Print 1961». 
81. ld. at 1295. 
82.ld. 
83. ld. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) states, in part: "Copyright protection subsists, 
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fiXed in any tangible medi-
um of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device." 
84. ld. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) states: "In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 
10
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contained in a compilation,86 and that copyright :protection 
available to a compilation extends only to original selection, 
coordination, or arrangement.86 
D. THE ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT AFTER FEIST 
The Court explained that the key to originality lies in the 
"manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coor-
dinated, and arranged."87 The Court suggests that a mechan-
ical or routine manner of selection, coordination or arrangement 
may not meet the low standard of originality.88 Further, the 
Court notes that the originality standard is not met in arrange-
ments which are obvious, common place, expedient, tradi-
tional, or inevitable.89 
The Court determined that Rural Telephone Company's 
arrangement of its white pages was "entirely typical," and 
"could not be more obvious. "90 Additionally, the Court hinted in 
dicta that Rural Telephone Company did not engage in any 
selection process whatsoever, but rather that, by virtue of its 
monopoly franchise, it "selected" included information based 
on a mandate by the Kansas Corporation Commission.91 
Finally, the Court noted that constitutionally, copyright 
anticipates that some works will fail to achieve originality, and 
that if Rural Telephone Company's alphabetized list of sub-
scribers is deemed "original," then all works are origina1.92 
The Court stated that to warrant copyright protection, a work's 
creative spark must be more than de minimis. 93 The Court 
85. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) states: "The copyright in a compilation or 
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, 
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not 
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is 
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or sub-
sistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material." 
86. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states, in part: "A 'compilation' is a work formed 
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective works." 
87. Id. at 1294. 
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found that Rural Telephone Company's white pages unques-
tionably did not meet this low standard.9' 
III. CRITIQUE: WHY THE COURT'S DECISION WAS 
CORRECT 
The Court's decision in Feist was supported by prior case 
law in the majority of the circuits,96 the plain language of the 
copyright statute,98 the purpose of the Constitutional grant to 
Congress,97 and the original moral meaning embodied in the 
notion of natu'ral law9s as well as the altruistic principles 
which underlie our jurisprudence in general. 99 Some theorists 
have posited that the lack oflegal debate regarding the dura-
tion of copyright protection can be seen as a rejection of the 
"natural law, fruit-of-the-creators-Iabor theory .... "100 
The Court's decision was narrow: to the extent Rural 
Telephone Company was not found to have satisfied original-
ity in its selection, its status as a public utility arguably 
played a part. IOI This means Feist's decision could be limited to 
instances involving public utilities or other situations where 
selection is pre-determined by mandate. 
The Court seemed to implicate Rural Telepone's Company 
standing as a public utility as an issue when it hinted in dicta 
that Rural Telephone Company did not voluntarily engage in 
any selection process, but rather made its selections based on 
requirements dictated by the Kansas Corporation Commission. 
94.Id. 
95. More circuits previously followed the "selection" heory than the "sweat of the 
brow· theory. See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 
(9th Cir. 1989) on remand 1991 W.L. 138317 (only selection, coordination and arrange-
ment were protectable, blank forms were not); Harper &: Row v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 548 (1985) [hereinafter Harper & Rowl (stating it is permissible to copy facts 
"from a prior author's work"); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984), 
afrd, 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). 
96. Patry, Copyright in Compilation of Facts (Or Why the 'White Pages' Are Not 
Copyrightable), 12 COMM. &: LAw 37 (Dec. 1990). 
97. Id. at 64. 
98. Yen, supra note 27, at 517 n.1. 
99. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1713. 
100. Lacey, supra note 30, at 1547 n.73. 
101. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97. The Court stated: "[wle note in passing ... Rural 
did not truly 'select' to publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers; 
rather it was required to do so by the Kansas Corporation Commission as part of its 
. monopoly franchise."Id. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/13
1992] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 541 
Indeed, the Court seems to hint that, by virtue of its monopoly 
status as a public utility, Rural Telephone Company merely 
waited for the listing information to come to it, and was 
required to include all of this material in its directory. 
Facts have never been copyrightable,102 and therefore Feist 
should have come as no surprise. The First Amendment man-
dates copyright's idea/expression dichotomy, which ensures 
copyright law will not restrict freedom of speech by protecting 
ideas. 103 The "sweat of the brow" theory was merely used to put 
the round peg of copyright into the square hole of protection for 
labor. 
The Court's decision was unanimous. 104 In Feist, the Court 
insists it has merely stated the law as it has always been. 
Certainly, if the Court were suddenly announcing new law, one 
would expect to see either an opinion which somehow reflect-
ed that fact, or dissenting opinions. There are no such indica- . 
tions in Feist. The Court's clear unified stance should create 
certainty and uniformity. 
Additionally, the Court's decision leads to many practical 
results demonstrating its propriety. These practical implica-
tions follow. 
A. PRACTITIONER FEARS AND FEIST'S IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER 
DATABASES 
Before turning to implications for other databases, a brief 
discussion of what comprises a database is in order. Briefly, a 
database is any compilation of information arranged in a use-
ful fashion. This includes ordinary printed library card cata-
logues indexed on three-by-five cards, as well as sophisticated 
compilations designed for computer use such as LEXIS. Feist 
involved a database, since the directory was a compilation of 
subscriber information arranged alphabetically. 
Practitioner fears that Feist means a loss of income from or 
protection to most databases is unfounded. This is so because: 
102. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 ("[tlhe public interest in the free flow of in for-
mation is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts"). 
103. Id. at 556. 
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1) arrangement, coordination and selection provide copyright 
protection; 2) databases are protected from wholesale copying 
and reshuffling; and 3) telephone utilities, in particular, have 
built-in assurances that licensing agreements will not end. 
1. Arrangement, Coordination and Selection Provide 
Copyright Protection 
Some practitioners believe that databases are now vul-
nerable to copyright protection attacks because selection may 
be lacking when all available information is included on an indi-
vidual topic. l06 However, these fears fail to recognize that copy-
right can also be based on arrangement and coordination. 
Even if a database does include an entire universe of infor-
mation, it is likely to be arranged and coordinated in such a way 
as to meet the low test of originality. 106 Additionally, an argu-
ment can be made that the decision to include an entire uni-
verse of information is itself selection. Such selection expresses 
the judgment that all data is useful in a particular application, 
and should therefore be included. l07 This argument is likely 
viable despite Rural Telephone Company's inclusion of its 
entire universe of information and subsequent failure to sat-
isfy originality in selection in Feist. This is because of the 
Court's hint in dicta that selection was imposed on Rural 
Telephone Company by reason of its status as a public utility, 
rather than Rural Telephone Company originating its selection. 
2. Databases are Protected From Wholesale Copying and 
Reshuffling 
Some practitioners fear that copyright protection based on 
originality in selection, arrangement or coordination is insuf-
ficient to prevent databases from wholesale copying and reshuf-
fling, even if the requisite originality is present. lOS It is true that 
regardless of originality, facts have always been subject to 
copying. l09 However, copyright protection is available for for-
mats of factual compilations. For example, yellow pages 
105. Celedonia, Feist v. Rural Telephone: Is the Sky Falling for Directory 
Publishers?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1991, at 28, col. 5. 
106. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97. (The Court in Feist defined originality as not 
being "mechanical" or "inevitable"). 
107. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 5. 
108. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 14, at 54. 
109. Celedonia, supra note 105 at 4, col. 4. 
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compiled on a software disc are still likely to receive consid-
erable protection from wholesale copying and reshuflling. In the 
recent case of Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. 
DonneUey Information Publishing, Inc.,l1O the court found, 
relying on Feist, that "yellow" pages were sufficiently original 
in their selection, coordination and arrangement to be copy-
rightable. 1l1 Furthermore, the court found that for copyright 
purposes, a work is "fixed in a tangible form" if the information 
has been stored on magnetic tape. Additionally, any keying of 
this formatted information into a computer and storing it, 
regardless of an intent to subsequently reshuffle it to create a 
"new" work, amounts to copyright infringement of the for-
mat. 112 This provides copyright protection to yellow pages, by 
recognizing that simply keying the copyrighted format into a 
computer and storing it in any fashion results in copying. 
Thus, misappropriation is prevented because taking and 
rearranging unprotected information results in copyright 
infringement of the arrangement. Once the copyrighted format 
has been copied and stored, the infringement is complete. 
Because any misappropriation would necessarily require that 
one first copy and then change the format, this provides sub-
stantial protection. 
3. Telephone Utilities have Built-In Protection from Loss of 
Licensing Revenues 
Telephone companies traditionally enter into agreements 
licensing use of their subscriber information, rather than sell-
ing it to competitors. Some telephone utilities believe the Feist 
decision will lead to fewer or no licensing agreements between 
themselves and competing book publishers, resulting in a loss 
of revenue that will ultimately be made up by ratepayers. 113 In 
reality, utilities have built-in protection from such loss of rev-
enues. 
110. 933 F.2d 952 (l1th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Donnelley]. 
111. [d. at 958. Compare Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley 
Information Publishing Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991) with Key Publications, Inc. 
v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
yellow-page phone directory listings can be copied as long as the material is organized 
in a different manner by the copier; so long as this "copying" does not involve keying 
formatted information from magnetic tape into a computer, this decision is consistent 
with Donnelley). 
112. [d. 
113. Communications Daily, Mar. 28, 1991, at 6 (quoting Marie Guillory of 
Nat'l Tel. Coop. Assoc.: "[I]fduplicated white pages cut into revenue of Yellow Pages, 
which supports basic rates, then ratepayers could be harmed.") 
15
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a. It is Unlikely Licensing Agreements will be Lost 
The Court's decision in Feist is not seen as a major setback 
by many telephone utilities. 114 This is so because it is doubtful 
that white page competitors will completely abandon license 
agreements. The utilities are the first source of current infor-
mation regarding customer changes in service and information, 
including new connects and disconnects.1I6 This means that if 
a publisher desires the most current and therefore most accu-
rate information, a licensing agreement is still the only way to 
obtain this information from the utility. This is so because 
the printed copies of a utility's book are about six weeks out of 
, date the day they are published, so that an independent pub-
lisher who relies on them will ultimately publish a book whose 
information is months out of date. 116 Realistically then, inde-
pendent publishers of white pages will still most likely find it 
necessary to enter into license agreements with utilities. This 
assumes independent publishers are interested in competing 
in the market. 
(1) Even Assuming Loss of Licensing Agreements, 
Ratepayers are not Necessarily Disadvantaged 
Even if licensing agreements were no longer entered into 
between utilities and independent publishers resulting in 
higher utility rates, since competing directories would be sav-
ing licensing costs, it is likely this would be reflected in lower 
advertisement rates to yellow pages advertisers in independent 
directories. This would in turn mean that, in order to remain 
competitive, utility yellow page directories could not continue 
to charge as much for their advertisements. 
Ultimately it seems likely that these cost savings to vari-
ous businesses and retailers who advertise in the directories 
would in turn be passed on to the ultimate consumers, who are 
114. [d. (quoting spokesperson for Bell Atlantic: "[Feist] does not affect our busi-
ness dealings with any of our independent directory dealers.") 
115. See, e.g., Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 5 (stating: "[i]t is this 'value 
added' -- the currency of the information -- which the various telephone companies can 
continue to license"); Moses, Publishers Move to Prevent Directories From Becoming 
Open Books for Rivals, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at B4, col. 6 (quoting Russell 
Perkins, publisher of a directory-industry newsletter, stating: "Information ages ... and 
they can only steal it from you once.") 
116. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 29 n.24, col. 2. 
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also the ratepayers. Therefore, consumers are beneficiaries of 
the Feist decision whether or not rates rise. 
B. ALTERNATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS 
While the decision in Feist makes it clear that facts are not 
copyrightable, there are ample protections available to com-
pilations when necessary. 
1. Copyright Protection zs Not Appropriate zn All 
Circumstances 
Not all fact-based compilations are contemplated for copy-
right protection.117 Clearly, the language of both the 
Constitution and copyright legislation do not comprehend 
copyright protection for mere facts. 118 
This is as it should be. The Constitutional purpose of copy-
right is "to encourage the widest possible production and dis-
semination of literary, musical and artistic works. "119 
Concomitantly, the First Amendment demands that factual 
expression not be restricted by copyright.120 
The altruistic principle which dictates the moral sharing 
of individual accomplishments in order to promote the public 
welfare would wither under a scheme extending copyright 
protection to facts. As previously noted, protection of facts 
was "the most glaring flaw" of the "sweat of the brow" theory.121 
2. Ample Alternative Protections Exist Where Copyright is Not 
Appropriate 
To the extent the courts find it advantageous to grant pro-
tection to non-copyrightable works, this may be accomplished 
117. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297. 
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1988) states, in part: "In no case does copyright pro-
tection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work." 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states, in part, that Congress has the power to "pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (inter-
preting the Constitutional grant of power as primarily designed to evolve new works, 
not compensate authors). 
119. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRiNCIPLES, LAw AND PRACTICE, § 1.2, at 11 (1989). 
120. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
121. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1291. 
17
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through a variety of alternative theories. These include unfair 
competition,122 contract and trade secret law,123 and restitution. 124 
In Feist, the Court suggests that "'[p]rotection for the fruits 
of.. .research ... may in certain circumstances be available under 
a theory of unfair competition.'"125 
One copyright practitioner suggests the use of contract 
and trade secret law. 126 Recently, one theorist has posited that 
not only is restitution law available for protection of non-
copyrightable works, but that it has previously been used for 
this purpose. 127 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Court's decision in Feist has created no new law, 
but merely clarified it by holding that the "sweat of the brow" 
theory was never capable of meeting the Constitutionally 
mandated originality requirement. The decision was narrow, 
and perhaps in some ways limited due to Rural Telephone 
Company's status as a public utility. 
The decision in Donnelley suggests that substantial pro-
tection is available because formats are copyrightable. This 
includes various fact-based databases. 
To the extent non-copyrightabl,e materials should be pro-
vided protection, there are alternative theories available such 
as unfair competition, contract and trade secret law, and 
restitution. 
Finally, the higher moral purpose of individual sharing 
for the public good is promoted because others now have access 
122. Id. at 1292 (quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04, 
at 3-23 (1990)). 
123. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 6. 
124. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1455 (1989). 
125. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292 (quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 3.04, at 3-23 (1990)). 
126. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 6. 
127. Gordon, supra note 124, at 1455 n.490 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's 
protection to non-copyrightable works on a "quasi-property" theory was a device 
meant to be used in reaching fair results where allowing use of another's labor seems 
unfair, in International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918». 
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to compiled factual infonnation on which new ideas can be built 
without fear of copyright infringement. That the Court has seen 
fit to inject altruistic principles into this area of copyright 
law should be welcomed. 128 
Sherrie Callis* 
128. Kennedy notes that, "the judge ... is at work on the indispensable task ofimag-
ining an altruistic order .... It seems to me that we should be grateful for this much, and 
wish the enterprise what success is possible short of the overcoming of its contradic-
tions." Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1778. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law Class of 1992. 
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